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Abstract: This study explores how monetary policy changes flow through the banking sector 
in Australia. Drawing on data between 2004 and 2010, we divide banks into three groups 
according to their size, and examine the impact of cash rate change on lending of different 
types of loans. We found the response of bank lending after a monetary policy change varies 
with the size of the bank as well as the types of loan.  
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1. Introduction 
It is well documented that a monetary contraction is followed by a decline in aggregate bank 
lending (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, Kashyap and Stein, 2000). However, the channel 
through which this policy is transmitted in different economies is unclear. Transmission 
channels identified in the literature are interest rate, bank lending, balance sheet and 
exchange rate channels (Becketti and Morris, 1992; Kakes and Sturm, 2002; Kashyap and 
Stein, 1995; Chang and Jansen, 2005). The functioning of these channels is influenced by the 
economic, legal and financial structure in a specific country. Thus, differences in the structure 
of financial markets across countries would imply differences in transmission mechanisms. 
Therefore, a good understanding of the major transmission channels for a particular economy 
is essential to design a tailored monetary policy and to anticipate the impact of this policy. 
Given the crucial role of banks in facilitating the flow of funds, the bank lending channel has 
received considerable attention among researchers and practitioners concerned with the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. 
Australia’s banking industry is dominated by four big banks: Commonwealth Bank, National 
Bank, Australia and New Zealand Bank (ANZ) and Westpac. The big four holds more than 
90 per cent of total loans. It was argued that analysing panel data on banks’ balance sheets is 
not of much value given the highly concentrated banking industry (Suzuki 2004). However, 
given that the primary monetary policy decision of the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has 
been to set the interest rate on overnight loans in the money market with the expectation that 
“the behaviour of borrowers and lenders in the financial markets is affected by monetary 
policy” (Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), 2011), we cannot be sure that such expectation is 
realistic or not unless we can produce the evidence of the changed behaviour, more 
importantly, which group or which type of loans is more likely to change after a monetary 
policy shock .  
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Despite nearly two decades of policy implementation, there has been very little research on 
the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Australia. Suzuki (2004) is the only study of 
lending channels in Australia and he argues that loan contraction is largely due to a change in 
demand, thus lending channels are not dominant in Australia. 
The drawback of aggregate data is the inability to identify whether there are differences in the 
way banks with different characteristics respond to policy shocks. It is difficult for policy 
makers to evaluate the impact of monetary policy without knowing how different groups of 
banks and different types of loans react to cash rate changes. Micro-data, on the other hand, 
will allow us to identify areas that are more sensitive to policy changes and to prepare for 
these changes. Besides, similar studies performed in European countries that have similar 
concentration levels in their banking industry support the existence of lending channels in 
some countries (Altunbas et al., 2002), it is worthwhile to conduct similar studies in Australia. 
Australia presents an interesting case to study lending channels among developed economies. 
Similar to European countries, Australia has a highly concentrated banking industry with the 
largest four banks accounting for more than 70 per cent of asset value. Unlike countries 
within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) that have similar monetary policy but are 
under different legal and financial structures, Australia’s economy operates under the same 
legal and financial structure and has the same monetary and fiscal policy. Therefore, it 
presents a good case to study bank lending channels in a small open economy. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, 
followed by data and the research methodology in Section 3. Section 4 presents the 
econometric results, and the paper concludes with a summary of the major findings and 
policy implications. 
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2. Literature Review 
Several studies have searched for empirical evidence of bank lending channels by employing 
aggregate data. An influential work by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) uses a vector auto 
regression (VAR) model to show that a contractionary monetary policy induces a decline in 
bank loans and economic activities. Many researchers have applied this methodology to 
different countries  (Ashcraft, 2006, Ramlogan, 2004, Suzuki, 2004). However, their findings 
are inconsistent in terms of the role of the bank lending channel. For example, Kakes and 
Sturm (2002) analyse the impact of monetary shocks on bank lending in Germany and find 
that the response of bank lending after a monetary contraction varies considerably among 
banks of different sizes. The lending of the smallest banks declined most, whereas big banks 
were able to shield their loans portfolio against monetary shocks. Overall, their results 
provide support for the existence of a bank lending channel. Ramlogan (2004) shows that the 
credit and exchange rate channels are more important than the interest rate channel in 
Caribbean countries. Buigut (2010) tests the lending channel using a vector error correction 
model in a framework that allows the identification of the shifts of demand and supply 
schedules in the bank loan market. The findings suggest the dominance of the bank lending 
channel in Kenya. In general, the majority of studies on asymmetries in the monetary 
transmission mechanism are based on macroeconomic evidence, which is abundant but often 
contradictory. 
In practice, it is difficult to identify whether monetary policy directly affects loan supply or 
loan demand, as deposits are likely to contract when bank loans contract. One can then argue 
that a monetary tightening reduces aggregate demand for bank loans. A way to test this 
lending view is to examine the responses of banks to monetary policy using micro-data from 
the banks’ balance sheets. Kashyap and Stein (1995) separate banks according to asset size 
and find that bank loan growth in the smallest asset category (below the ninety-fifth 
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percentile) is most responsive to monetary policy. Although they find support for the bank 
lending channel, they surmise that this test may not be stringent enough to separate loan 
supply effects from demand shocks. Kashyap and Stein (1997) further separate banks by asset 
size and liquidity and find that the smallest most illiquid banks are most responsive to policy 
changes. Recent studies using European data reveal some interesting findings. Ehrmann et al.  
(2003) find that monetary policy does alter bank loan supply, with the effects most dependent 
on the liquidity of individual banks. Unlike in the United States, the size of a bank generally 
does not explain its lending reaction. Altunbas et al. (2002) classify banks according to asset 
size and capital strength and find that across the EMU systems, undercapitalised banks (of 
any size) tend to respond more to changes in policy. Using a similar method, Matousek and 
Sarantis (2009) argue that bank size and liquidity play the most significant role in 
distinguishing banks’ reactions to changes in monetary policy. Because of the lack of data, 
empirical studies on the relationship between monetary policy and loan growth outside the 
US have been dominated by cross-country studies (Altunbas, Fazylov and Molyneux, 2002; 
Ashcraft, 2006; Berger, 2003; Wang, 2010). Studies on the US market found evidence of 
bank lending channel and that different sized banks have different sensitivities to monetary 
policy (Kishan and Opiela, 2000, Matousek and Sarantis, 2009).  
In summary, existing research supports the existence of a bank lending channel and suggests 
that size and liquidity are factors that influence the magnitude of the policy response. 
However, in the absence of study on lending channels in Australia, a separate study for 
Australia is still necessary. In particular, we are interested in answering the following 
questions: 
1. Is there evidence of bank lending channels in Australia? 
2. Do different types of loans respond differently to monetary policy? 
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3. Do banks of different sizes respond differently to monetary policy? 
This paper takes a different perspective by using microeconomic data, the information 
contained in the balance sheets of individual banks, to study the sensitivity of banks in 
Australia to monetary policy. Thus, it extends the literature by specifying asset size along 
with different types of loans, to identify particular types of loans that are sensitive to 
monetary show further evidence of the existence of the bank lending channel in Australia 
3. Data and Method 
As shown by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), macroeconomic time series are not helpful in 
identifying a lending channel that is actually the sub-channel of a credit channel. Aggregate 
data do not allow us to distinguish between supply and demand factors that affect the banks’ 
lending activities. Micro-data on banks, on the other hand, may effectively capture the 
distributional effects of monetary policy through a lending channel. Figure 1 shows the loan 
growth and the cash rate in Australia (2004:3–2010:12). The aggregate loan grew steadily 
during these years. We can clearly see that monetary policy has been contradictory except for 
the period between September 2008 and August 2010. 
 
Lending: Million A$. Interest Rate: %. 
Figure 1: Loan growth and the cash rate in Australia (2004:3–2010:12) 
 
Suppose that, as a result of monetary tightening, a bank’s deposits decline. It can respond 
either by reducing its loans or by selling some of its securities holdings or liquid assets. Thus, 
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liquidity and changes in deposits and holdings of securities affect bank lending. We therefore 
include liquidity and changes in deposits and holdings of securities in the econometric 
equation as control variables. However, research shows that liquidity and changes in deposits 
and holdings of securities can be influenced by the unobserved individual-level random effect, 
and thus should be considered as endogenous variables. To exclude the impact of the 
unobserved individual random effect, we choose the Hausman–Taylor estimator for the error-
components model as our econometric method and to control for individual-specific 
unobservable effects
2
. In addition to the above balance-sheet items, we use a proxy for 
changes in monetary policy and a proxy for overall economic conditions. We use changes in 
cash rate as an indicator of monetary policy and the confidence index as an indicator for 
overall economic health. 
The empirical model is presented in the following equation: 
, 0 1 1 1 3 ,
, ,
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Securities liquidity Domestic u
   
   
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 (1) 
With i = 1, …, N, and t = 1, …, T, where i refers to a bank and t refers to a month. 
We divide bank loans into five categories: loans to non-financial corporations, loans to 
financial corporations, loans to government, loans to households, and intra-group loans. The 
change in loans is regressed on one lagged value of itself and “∆rate” is the change in cash 
rate. We used the changes in cash rate one and three months previous to allow us to observe 
when the policy started to take effect. It is possible to include lagged values of two and four 
months, but this leads to the multicollinearity problem, and does not improve the model fit 
significantly, thus we only use one- and three-month lagged values. Change of logarithm of 
                                                 
2
 The model fit panel-data random-effects model in which some of the covariates are correlated with the 
unobserved individual-level random effect. The estimators, originally proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
and Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986), are based on instrumental variables. 
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total deposits, change in liquidity and change in value of securities are also included as 
independent variables. The liquidity of a bank is measured as the ratio of the liquidity asset to 
the total asset and we also add a domestic dummy variable for domestic banks. i

 is the 
individual-specific effects and it
u
 is the residuals. 
The cash rate data were collected from the RBA’s website. Data on the balance sheet items of 
commercial banks (for example, various types of loans, securities and deposits) were sourced 
from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s website. The data are monthly from 
March 2004 to December 2010 for 61 commercial banks in Australia (15 Australian banks 
and 46 foreign banks). These 61 commercial banks account for 89.2% of the assets of the 
banking sector in Australia (RBA’s website).  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the bank balance-sheet data (2004:3–2010:12) (million $A) 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Obs 
Total 
resident 
assets 
Large 269429.2 118617.8 66125.1 536016.8 400 
Medium 26582.9 16766.0 221.6 75694.5 1182 
Small 3636.8 3794.3 1.4 21085.3 2842 
Gross 
loans 
Large 184828.9 78567 50044 371483.4 400 
Medium 14207.6 13962.9 15 64362.5 1182 
Small 1895.3 2164.3 .6 15371.2 2842 
Loans to 
non-
financial 
corporations 
Large 46441.2 23563.4 6484.3 95467.3 400 
Medium 4696.8 5684. 9 8.2 25352.7 1182 
Small 1430.5 1919.9 .3 11023.5 2842 
Loans to 
financial 
corporations 
Large 6194.9 4615.2 30.2 15791.3 400 
Medium 493.7 743.6 0 6569.67 1182 
Small 236.1 561.1 0 7829 2842 
Loans to 
households 
Large 130465.6 55113.7 42723.7 296232.8 400 
Medium 8662.2 9905.7 0 41154.0 1181 
Small 151.1 638.0 0 6123.3 2842 
Loans to 
government 
Large 1182.6 2370.2 3.5 11979.0 400 
Medium 15.0 44.3 0 419.3 1182 
Small .02 .74 0 34.4 2842 
Intra-group Large 7552.2 6550.6 1636.0 34950.5 400 
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Loans Medium 3862.741 6667.171 0 40562.96 1182 
Small 386.9315 1396.48 0 10660.2 2842 
Note: A resident is an individual, business or other organisation domiciled in Australia. Australian branches and Australian 
subsidiaries of foreign businesses are regarded as residents. 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia and Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. 
 
We divided the 61 banks into three groups according to their asset value on December 31, 
2010. Four large banks with a resident assets value of more than $A100,000 million form 
Group 1 or large banks, Group 2 contains 16 banks with a resident assets value between 
$A10,000 and 100,000 million, and is labelled as medium banks in the following discussion. 
The third group includes 40 banks with a resident assets value of less than $A10,000 million 
and is labelled as small banks. Banks whose gross loans were 0 on December 31, 2010 are 
excluded from the sample. The statistics of the variables used is summarised in Table 1. 
4. Results 
The data were pooled by bank size, and a separate regression was run for each type of loans. 
In addition, a separate regression was run to test the impact of contradictory monetary policy. 
The results are presented in five sections discussing impact monetary policy on gross loans, 
loans to non-financial corporations, loans to financial corporations, loans to government, 
loans to households, and intra-group loans, as well as contradictory monetary policy.  
4.1 The impact of monetary policy on changes in gross loans 
Table 2 provides the econometric results of the model using gross loans as the dependent 
variable. From Table 2 we can see clearly that the impact of monetary policy on gross loans 
is most significant for banks in groups 2 and 3, or small and medium-sized banks. The sums 
of the coefficients associated with changes in cash rate are negative, statistically significant, 
and larger in absolute value for the banks with assets of less than $100,000 million AUD, 
which shows that the small and medium-sized banks are more responsive to policy changes. 
In addition, banks in Group are less responsive than are the small and medium-sized banks. 
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This finding is consistent with research in the US (Berger and Udell, 1998, Kashyap and 
Stein, 1995). The results also show that cash rates lagged for one month have a negative 
impact on changes in gross loans for all groups while cash rates lagged for three months have 
no significant impact. A possible explanation is that smaller banks have few sources of 
funding, and limited access to cheap funding, so a change in the official cash rate will have a 
more significant impact on their funding by increasing their cost of funding compared with 
the larger banks. A contractionary monetary policy does not necessarily lead to more funding 
for smaller banks via high deposits due to their limited capacity to attract deposits. 
Consequently, their loan supply will be more responsive to monetary policy than will that of 
the larger banks. The scope of the lagged one-period effect is larger within the three groups, 
as indicated by the coefficients. 
As illustrated in Table 2, the change in the cash rate in the previous month has a significant 
negative impact on the change in gross loans of all banks, although the link seems to be more 
significant for small and medium-sized banks, whose lending is also significantly linked with 
the confidence level. 
Changes in deposits and security holdings have a significant impact on changes in gross loans 
for all groups, which seems to confirm the existence of the lending channel. That is, a 
contractionary monetary policy that decreases bank deposits and security holdings will 
reduce the amount of funds available for banks to lend to their borrowers and hence reduce 
gross loans. 
Surprisingly, liquidity has no impact on banks’ lending behaviour. This is different from 
findings in the US and European countries (e.g., Kashyap and Stein, 2000; Ehrmann et al., 
2001). It is interesting to see whether the pattern remains the same for the subgroups of loans. 
Table 2: The effect of monetary policy on changes in gross loans 
ΔLn(Gross loans) Large Medium Small 
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TV exogenous    
ΔCash rate 
.1326253 
(0.180) 
.1320999** 
(0.018) 
.1412393*** 
(0.000) 
L1. 
–.2320546** 
(0.050) 
–.2320075*** 
(0.001) 
–.2398461*** 
(0.000) 
L3. 
.0210143 
(0.842) 
.0176682 
(0.769) 
.0274472 
(0.477) 
ΔConfidence 
.0057412* 
(0.098) 
.0059369*** 
(0.003) 
.005918*** 
(0.000) 
TV endogenous    
ΔLn(Total deposits) 
.2126814*** 
(0.001) 
.202142*** 
(0.000) 
.2191146 *** 
(0.000) 
ΔLiquidity 
.2089094 
(0.575) 
.1991415 
(0.349) 
.2103143 
(0.138) 
ΔLn(Securities) 
.2030038*** 
(0.000) 
.2014548*** 
(0.000) 
.2258066*** 
(0.000) 
TI exogenous    
Nationality 
–.0001035 
(0.998) 
–.0085087 
(0.722) 
–.0045696 
(0.853) 
No. of obs 385 1134 2272 
Wald Test 
67.86*** 
(0.000) 
199.06*** 
(0.000) 
531.82*** 
(0.000) 
Note:  1. TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
 2. P-values in parentheses. 
* = Significant at 10% confidence level. ** = Significant at 5% confidence level. *** = Significant at 1% confidence 
level. 
4.2 The effect of monetary policy on changes in non-financial loans 
By the end of 2009, small and medium-sized banks jointly account for 12 per cent of total 
non-financial loans, with the rest issued by the big banks. 
As illustrated in Table 3, changes in non-financial loans are negatively linked with the cash 
rate changes in the current period as well as three months ago for all groups, although the link 
is stronger for small and medium banks. The change in confidence level has a significant 
positive impact on changes in non-financial loans, suggesting that this type of loan is heavily 
affected by economic conditions. 
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While security holdings continue to affect changes in non-financial loans, changes in deposits 
have little influence on loans issued by large banks . Given the dominant position of large 
banks, it may be argued that the lending channel is less evident in non-financial loans. 
Table 3: The effect of monetary policy on changes in non-financial loans 
ΔLn(Non-financial loans) Large Medium Small 
TV exogenous    
ΔCash rate 
–.185068** 
 (0.043) 
–.1885477** 
(0.000) 
–.1769455*** 
(0.000) 
 L1. 
–.0153639 
(0.888) 
.0009321 
(0.988) 
–.0162217 
(0.686) 
 L3. 
–.1712364* 
(0.079) 
–.1719267** 
(0.002) 
–.1705182*** 
(0.000) 
ΔConfidence 
.0118983*** 
(0.000) 
.0122596*** 
(0.000) 
.0120309*** 
(0.000) 
TV endogenous    
ΔLn(Total deposits) 
.0640309 
(0.292) 
.080041*** 
(0.021) 
.0623335*** 
(0.006) 
ΔLiquidity 
–.0837326 
(0.808) 
–.1037231 
(0.599) 
–.0828052 
(0.529) 
ΔLn(Securities) 
.281488*** 
(0.000) 
.2769269*** 
(0.000) 
.2933415*** 
(0.000) 
TI exogenous    
Nationality 
–.003394 
(0.931) 
–.0044687 
(0.840) 
–.0040756 
(0.859) 
No. of obs 385 1134 2272 
Wald Test 
124.81*** 
(0.000) 
368.24*** 
(0.000) 
968.54*** 
(0.000) 
Note: 1. TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
 2. P-values in parentheses. 
 * = Significant at 10% confidence level. ** = Significant at 5% confidence level. *** = Significant at 1% confidence 
level. 
4.3 The effect of monetary policy on changes in financial loans 
Similar to non-financial loans, large banks control 90 per cent of the market, and small and 
medium-sized banks share the rest. 
Table 4: The effect of monetary policy on changes in financial loans 
ΔLn(Financial loans) Large Medium Small 
TV exogenous    
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ΔCash rate 
.3328578 
 (0.122) 
.3295236 *** 
(0.007) 
.3460091*** 
(0.000) 
L1. 
–.5703139 
(0.026) 
–.5758824 *** 
(0.000) 
–.5784877*** 
(0.000) 
L3. 
.221212 
(0.96) 
.2378541 ** 
(0.073) 
.222943*** 
(0.007) 
ΔConfidence 
.0067025 
(0.374) 
.0066106 
(0.130) 
.0057959** 
(0.040) 
TV endogenous    
ΔLn(Total deposits) 
.1882708 
(0.187) 
.1812147 ** 
(0.028) 
.1823482*** 
(0.001) 
ΔLiquidity 
1.830437 ** 
(0.024) 
1.84819*** 
(0.000) 
1.801847*** 
(0.000) 
ΔLn(Securities) 
.1510513** 
(0.021) 
.1492991*** 
(0.000) 
.1503628*** 
(0.000) 
TI exogenous    
Nationality 
.0001091 
(0.999) 
.0017764 
(0.973) 
–.0038054 
(0.943) 
No. of obs 385 1134 2272 
Wald Test 
16.48 ** 
(0.0360) 
48.63*** 
(0.000) 
121.97*** 
(0.000) 
Note: 1. TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
 2. P-values in parentheses. 
 * = Significant at 10% confidence level. ** = Significant at 5% confidence level. *** = Significant at 1% confidence 
level. 
 
We can see from Table 4 that cash rate changes have a significant impact only on the 
financial loans of the small and medium-sized banks. However, liquidity plays an important 
role in this type of loan. It has a significant positive impact on the financial loans of all banks, 
with the relationship being more significant among banks in small and medium-sized groups. 
Deposit and security holdings remain significant but less important factors for financial loans. 
The results suggest that financial loans issued by large banks are not sensitive to either cash 
rate changes or changes in deposits, but are subject to liquidity constraint. Changes in 
securities, on the other hand, have a consistently significant impact on changes in financial 
loans across the three groups, which implies a strong link between security and financial 
loans. Liquidity also has a significant effect on financial loan growth within the three groups. 
Changes in deposits may be more important for small and medium-sized groups. 
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4.4 The effect of monetary policy on changes in household loans 
In household loan market, the large banks have the largest market share, with the small banks 
having about 0.2% and the medium-sized banks 5.8% of market share, respectively. 
Table 5 provides estimates of the effect of policy on changes in household loans. Household 
loans across all three groups are insensitive to the current change in cash rates. Since 
household loans are often collateralized and have long maturity, they cannot be readily 
adjusted relative to other types of loan. Thus, household loans are less responsive to monetary 
policy than are the other types of loans, which defies common sense. The one-period lagged 
cash rate change has a negative effect on financial loan growth while the lagged three-period 
cash rate changes have a positive effect. 
An interesting issue to note here is that changes in securities have a negative effect on 
changes in household loans. The effect of changes in deposits and securities has a very 
significant explanatory power in all cases. The liquidity rate has no significant effect on 
household loans for the three groups. 
Table 5: The effect of monetary policy on changes in household loans 
ΔLn(Household loans) Large Medium Small 
TV exogenous    
ΔCash rate 
–.1006575 
 (0.650) 
–.0817947 
(0.481) 
–.0932167 
 (0.258) 
L1. 
–.2878169 
(0.278) 
–.2284416 
(0.101) 
–.2758241*** 
(0.005) 
L3. 
.4510989* 
(0.057) 
.3720929*** 
(0.003) 
.4612669*** 
(0.000) 
ΔConfidence 
.0030403 
 (0.696) 
.0026412 
(0.522) 
.0034277 
(0.254) 
TV endogenous    
ΔLn(Total deposits) 
.8827474*** 
(0.000) 
.7242075*** 
(0.000) 
.9244411*** 
(0.000) 
ΔLiquidity 
.175362 
 (0.834) 
.165428 
(0.708) 
.2231911 
(0.491) 
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Note: 1. TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
 2. P-values in parentheses. 
 * = Significant at 10% confidence level. ** = Significant at 5% confidence level. *** = Significant at 1% confidence 
level. 
 
4.5 The effect of monetary policy on changes in government loans and intra-group loans 
The distribution of government and intra-group loans provides an interesting contrast. While 
large banks issue 99 per cent of total government loans, their share of intra-group loans is less 
than two-thirds, suggesting that intra-group loans are an important funding mechanism for 
small and medium-sized banks.  
From Table 6 we can see that the factors that influence government loans are quite different 
from those for other types of loan. First, loans issued by large banks are not affected by 
changes in cash rates or confidence levels. Second, while changes in security holdings are a 
significant factor for all other types of loans, they have little impact on government loans. 
Liquidity, on the other hand, seems to play an important role in this regard.  Changes in 
government loans are negatively associated with change of deposit. In other words, an 
increase in deposits tends to reduce loans to government. A possible explanation for this 
negative relationship is that banks may issue more government loans when the economy is 
not performing well. Changes in deposits tend to be in line with economic performance. 
Overall, loans to government seem to complement other types of loans and to depend heavily 
on bank liquidity. 
 
ΔLn(Securities) 
–.0402598 
 (0.550) 
–.0301845 
(0.403) 
–.0449075* 
(0.076) 
TI exogenous    
Nationality 
.0072881 
(0.939) 
–.0419768 
(0.399) 
–.0044369 
(0.937) 
No. of obs 385 1134 2272 
Wald Test 
46.05*** 
(0.0120) 
111.29*** 
(0.000) 
346.10*** 
(0.000) 
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Table 6: The effect of monetary policy on changes in government loans 
ΔLn(Government loans) Large Medium Small 
TV exogenous    
ΔCash rate 
.0330169 
 (0.531) 
.0326211 
(0.285) 
.0346448* 
(0.093) 
L1. 
–.086053 
(0.172) 
–.0835685** 
(0.022) 
–.0933477*** 
(0.000) 
L3. 
–.0517623 
(0.357) 
–.0429927 
(0.191) 
–.049594*** 
(0.024) 
ΔConfidence 
.001769 
 (0.338) 
.0020297* 
(0.061) 
.0023289*** 
(0.002) 
TV endogenous    
ΔLn(Total deposits) 
–.1235304*** 
(0.000) 
–.1086009*** 
(0.000) 
–.1273584*** 
(0.000) 
ΔLiquidity 
.2414917*** 
(0.224) 
.2660619*** 
(0.022) 
.3099602*** 
(0.000) 
ΔLn(Securities) 
.0021544 
(0.893) 
.0004288 
(0.964) 
.0020581 
(0.745) 
TI exogenous    
Nationality 
.0051246 
(0.23) 
.0093967 
(0.472) 
.0062112 
(0.659) 
No. of obs 385 1134 2272 
Wald Test 
19.60*** 
(0.0120) 
48.15*** 
(0.000) 
137.80*** 
(0.000) 
Note: 1. TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
 2. P-values in parentheses. 
 * = Significant at 10% confidence level. ** = Significant at 5% confidence level. *** = Significant at 1% confidence 
level. 
 
Table 7: The effect of monetary policy on changes in intra-group loans 
ΔLn(Intra-group loans) Large Medium Small 
TV exogenous    
ΔCash rate 
.0840316 
 (0.405) 
.0845311 
(0.132) 
.0865724** 
(0.023) 
L1 
.0061226 
(0.960) 
.0118461 
(0.860) 
–.0071046 
(0.876) 
L3 
–.1500607 
(0.163) 
–.1272457** 
(0.035) 
–.1417768*** 
(0.000) 
ΔConfidence 
.004108 
 (0.246) 
.0048333** 
(0.015) 
.0048743*** 
(0.000) 
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TV endogenous    
ΔLn(Total deposits) 
–.2639747*** 
(0.000) 
 –.225146*** 
(0.000) 
–.2751279*** 
(0.000) 
ΔLiquidity 
–1.045906*** 
(0.000) 
–1.025066*** 
(0.000) 
–1.033774*** 
(0.000) 
ΔLn(Securities) 
–.1343265*** 
(0.000) 
–.1378571*** 
(0.000) 
–.1316015*** 
(0.000) 
TI exogenous    
Nationality 
–.005263 
(0.903) 
.0102569 
(0.669) 
.0008866 
(0.973) 
No. of obs 385 1134 2272 
Wald Test 
52.65*** 
(0.0000) 
151.67*** 
(0.000) 
362.66*** 
(0.000) 
Note: 1. TV refers to time varying; TI refers to time invariant. 
 2. P-values in parentheses. 
 * = Significant at 10% confidence level. ** = Significant at 5% confidence level. *** = Significant at 1% confidence 
level. 
 
Government loans issued by banks in small and medium-sized groups   are sensitive to cash 
rate change in the previous month, and are sensitive to changes in confidence levels. 
However, since the large banks issue more than 99 per cent of government loans, we may 
conclude that liquidity is the single most important factor to influence this type of loan, and 
government loans may be more attractive when the economy is not performing well. 
Intra-group loans also display unique patterns in terms of factors. Similar to government 
loans, large banks are not sensitive to changes in cash rates or confidence levels. Liquidity 
again plays an important role, and changes in deposits and security holdings are negatively 
related to changes in intra-group loans. This negative relationship is not difficult to 
understand considering that the major purpose of intra-group loans is to provide extra funding 
for member banks that face liquidity issues and are unable to obtain enough funds from 
deposits and other sources. 
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4.6 Impact of Contractionary Monetary Policy 
This section provides estimates of the impact of contractionary monetary policy on different 
types of loans. Change in cash rate in the current period was excluded in the model to address 
the multicollinearity issue. Overall, we observe the correlation between change of the cash 
rate and lending across all types of loans Cash rate changes in both the one- and three-lagged 
periods have significant negative effects on loan growth apart from non-financial loans where 
only the cash rate change of one lagged period is significant. Changes in confidence levels 
also have a significant impact on all types of loan. Compared to the results showing that the 
impact of the confidence level is only evident for certain types of loan, this may imply that 
sentiment plays a more important role in a contractionary policy environment. The magnitude 
of the impact also varies among different types of loans. Non-financial loans are the most 
sensitive. A one per cent increase in the lagged one-period monetary policy rate leads to more 
than 1.1 per cent decline in the log of changes in non-financial loans while the same policy 
shock only leads to less than 0.5 per cent decline in the log of changes in household loans.
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Table 8: Impact of a Cash Rate Hike  
  ΔCash rate>0  
 Gross loans Non-financial loans Financial loans Household loans Government loans Intra-group loans 
ΔCash rate       
L1. –1.301463*** 
 (0.000) 
–1.132996*** 
 (0.000) 
–.9632873*** 
 (0.001) 
–.1228664*** 
 (0.000) 
–.1060478*** 
 (0.000) 
–1.037662*** 
 (0.000) 
L3. –1.539959*** 
 (0.000) 
–2.076279*** 
 (0.000) 
3.53035 
 (0.512) 
–.0627532*** 
 (0.000) 
–.0600187*** 
 (0.000) 
–.5473752*** 
 (0.000) 
ΔConfidence .0121635
*** 
 (0.000) 
.0068861*** 
 (0.000) 
.0450123*** 
 (0.000) 
.0018181*** 
 (0.000) 
.0021186*** 
 (0.000) 
.0254334*** 
(0.000) 
ΔLn(Total deposits) –.1211497** 
(0.015) 
–.0303632 
(0.514) 
–1.421162*** 
(0.000) 
–.0117843** 
(0.013) 
–.0293342*** 
(0.000) 
.1403724*** 
 (0.089) 
ΔLiquidity rate –2.657872*** 
 (0.000) 
–3.408447*** 
 (0.000) 
2.21163* 
 (0.059) 
.0480198*** 
 (0.002) 
–.0288224*** 
 (0.000) 
.6287878** 
(0.022) 
ΔLn(Securities) .5022572
*** 
(0.000) 
.6746423*** 
(0.000) 
.2309256*** 
(0.000) 
–.0063806 
(0.000) 
–.0080263*** 
(0.000) 
–.3248476*** 
(0.000) 
Nationality  .0000672 
(0.816) 
–.0032833 
(0.854) 
.0047947 
(0.755) 
.0009984 
(0.584) 
–.000863 
(0.201) 
.0124213 
(0.695) 
No. of obs 807 
Wald Test 4803.18
*** 
(0.000) 
9162.63*** 
(0.000) 
622.49*** 
(0.000) 
244.70*** 
(0.000) 
1493.08*** 
(0.000) 
427.68*** 
(0.000) 
Note: P-values in parentheses. 
 * = Significant at 10% confidence level. ** = Significant at 5% confidence level. *** = Significant at 1% confidence level
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5. Conclusions 
Previous studies suggest that the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is related to the 
economic, legal and financial structure of a specific country. Thus, country studies are 
important to understand the impact of monetary policy. This paper uses micro-data from 
individual bank balance sheets to study monetary policy on bank lending in Australia and 
reveals some interesting findings. 
First, this study confirms the existence of lending channels in Australia, which answers our 
first research question. A significant negative relationship between a change in the cash rate 
in the previous month and changes in loans has been identified for gross loans and non-
financial loans for all groups. Other types of loans issued by large banks are not sensitive to 
cash rate changes, but overall we observe a significant negative relationship between changes 
in loans and cash rate hikes, suggesting the lending channels are effective at least for 
contractionary policy. This finding is consistent with other studies that show a positive and 
insignificant effect of monetary policy on loan growth (Kashyap and Stein, 2000).  
Second, smaller banks are more sensitive to changes in the cash rate. Negative correlation at 
1 per cent significance level between lending and rate changes has been detected for all types 
of loans issued by small banks. Correlation at the same significance level has been found 
among medium banks for gross loans and financial loans, but the significance level dropped 
to 5 per cent for non-financial, government and intra-group loans. While the gross lending 
from the big banks is negatively related to the cash rate change in the previous month, it 
seems that such correlation is mainly driven by the changes in non-financial loans as no 
statistically significant correlation has been identified for other types of loan.    
Contrary to previous studies, we are unable to confirm the link between liquidity and changes 
in bank lending. The relationship between changes in liquidity and loans is not significant 
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except for financial, government and intra-group loans. The correlation is positive for the first 
two types, and negative for intra-group loans. It is surprising to observe the negative 
correlation between liquidity and intra-group loans, which seems to suggest that the more 
liquid a bank is, the less likely it will lend to another bank. While a significant link between 
liquidity and loan type has been detected in a contractionary policy environment, the 
direction of the impact varies among different loans. It is positively related to financial loans, 
household and intra-group loans, but negatively related to other types of loans. While it is 
possible to argue that liquidity plays different roles in different types of loans, further study is 
needed to provide more convincing evidence.  
Last, this study reveals that the impact of monetary policy varies with banks of different size 
and with different kinds of loans. Household loans seem to be the least sensitive to the rate 
changes as lending from large and medium banks is not significantly correlated with cash rate 
changes. Non-financial loans, on the other hand, seem to be most sensitive type with lending 
of all three groups significantly related the rate changes. Also the reaction time varies with 
different types of loans. Majority of loans are sensitive to the rate change in the previous 
month, but non-financial loans are sensitive to rate changes in both current month and three 
months ago, and intra-group loans are sensitive to rate change in three months ago. The 
different sensitivity of loans may be explained from both the supply and the demand side. 
From the demand side, it implies that demand elasticity for different types of loans may be 
different. Household loans, for example, may not be adjusted as easily as loans to the firms. 
From the supply side, the risk profile of different loans is quite different, which may affect 
bank’s willing to lend. Change of confidence index has strong impact on non-financial loans 
across all groups, but has little impact on household and financial loans. This suggests that 
non-financial loans are most likely to be affected by the change of economic conditions.  
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In summary, this study demonstrates how monetary policy changes flow through the banking 
sector, and different types of loans may react to monetary shock differently and factors 
associated with changes of loans varied with the lenders as well as types of loans.  Policy 
makers may need to bear this in mind when making decisions on monetary policy, and a 
coordination of regulatory and macroeconomic policies considering both bank size and the 
loan industry may offer better monetary control of bank loan growth or decline and the effect 
on real economic activity. 
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